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i
Within the field of regional economic development 
and planning there exist a number of unresolved is­
sues. Among these are a well-defined etiology for the 
emergence of unequal growth patterns within a given 
national space, a functional model for the interference 
of such unequal growth patterns with national devel­
opmental efforts, bases for making regional equal­
ization and/or decentralization policy choices, and 
the nature of evaluative criteria for measuring the ef­
fectiveness of these choices.
The literature which treats these problems is fairly 
small and far from unanimous. For example, regional 
growth disparities are attributed to initial differences 
in factor endowments1—which viewpoint construes re­
gional growth as the outcome of resource movements 
generated by earnings differentials; to the cumulative 
effect of external economies;2 to the existence of econ­
omic «poles de croissance» (growth poles);3 and to 
regional differences in production functions or in the 
demand for a region’s exports.4
The policy recommendations of economic planners 
comprise two distinct and mutually exclusive schools 
of thought, one of which assumes an elastic factor 
supply and stresses «balanced» growth5 with the other 
assuming an inelastic factor supply and favoring con­
centrated and sequential growth so that scalar and 
external economics can be maximized.6 The latter 
school in particular admits that international and 
interregional growth inequalities are a necessary con­
dition for continuous and sustained economic 
growth,7 so that the presence of «growth poles» is in­
dicative of the degree of economic maturity attained
1. This refers to the competitive or cumulative advantage 
of regions which supply the inputs that support «an extensive 
stream of nationally-wanted production». «See Harvey Perloff 
and Lowdon Wingo, «Natural Resource Endowment and Re­
gional Economic Growth», in Regional Development and 
Planning, ed. by J. Friedman and W. Alonso (Cambridge: 
M.I.T. Press, 1964), pp. 224-225.
2. Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Regions (London: Gerald Duinworthy and Co., Ltd., 1957).
3. F. Perroux, Théories et Politique de l’Expansion 
Regionale (Brussels, 1961).
4. G. H. Borts, «The Equalization of Returns and Regional 
Economic Growth», American Economic Review (June, 1960). 
See also, R. E. Baldwin, «Patterns of Development in Newly 
Settled Regions», Manchester School of Economics and So­
cial Studies, XXIV (May, 1956).
5. Gunnar Myrdal, Economic Theory and Underdeveloped 
Regions (London: Gerald Duinworthy and Co., Ltd., 1957).
6. Hollis Chenery, «Competitive Advantages and Develop­
ment Policy », American Economic Review, LI (March, 1961), 
18-51. See also, Ragnar Nurkse, Problems of Capital Forma­
tion in Underdeveloped Countries (New York: Oxford Uni­
versity Press, 1953).
7. A. O. Hirschman, «Interregional and International 
Transmission of Economic Growth».
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by various economic systems.1 This implies that 
countries in the early phases of their economic devel­
opment tend to exhibit keener regional growth dispa­
rities that may alter unfavorably the scheduling of 
profitable public investments and necessitate more 
infrastructural expenditures. Regional growth differ­
entials within the more economically advanced 
countries are viewed as welfare problems stemming 
from the immobility of human resources and the au­
tonomous changes in the metropolitan structure.2 In 
either case, there are serious repercussions for any 
given resource allocation patterns.
The question of whether regionally imbalanced ec­
onomic growth interferes with national development­
al objectives is a difficult one unless it can be said that 
uneven growth leads to excessive urbanization rates 
(within a limited spatial context), to the formation of 
large and uneconomical cities, and to the generation 
of unwarranted social costs. A simple yard-stick for 
gauging the interference of overurbanization and re­
gional imbalance with national economic development 
might be the dynamic change in the composition of 
the national investment budget. Available data sug­
gest that economic growth rates diminish appreciably 
as the non-productive share (crime prevention, wel­
fare payments, health expenditures, maintenance 
costs) of the total investment budget increases at the 
expense of the productive share (industrial develop­
ment, land reclamation projects, water resource de­
velopment, and the like). Lloyd Rodwin estimates 
that approximately 50 to 70 percent of the total in­
vestment budget of an average under-developed 
country is absorbed by social overhead.3 Research 
is needed to test the hypothesis pointing to the direct 
relationship between overurbanization and relatively 
increasing infrastructural investments.
The choise between regional equalization policies 
(designed to redistribute populations and economic 
activities in space) and regional development policies 
(designed to raise incomes, employment levels, and 
productivities of lagging regions) has historically been 
made with a full understanding of neither the array of 
tools available for implementation nor the implica­
tions of their use. Many paradoxes have emerged as
1. Myrdal has essentially expressed a similar view that im­
plicitly accepts the inevitability, if not desirability, of unbalanced 
economic growth—his «backwash» effects. See Economic 
Theory.
2. The association of «North-South» dualism with degree 
of economic development is demonstrated in J. G. Williamson, 
«Regional Inequality and the Process of National Develop­
ment: A Description of the Patterns», in Regional Analysis, 
ed. by L. Needleman (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1968), pp. 
99-158. See also, D. J. Plessas, The Decentralization Aspect, 
pp. 60-67.
3. Lloyd Rodwin, «Choosing Regions for Development», 
in Public Policy, ed. by Carl J. Friedrich and Seymour R.Har­
ris (New York: 1963), p. 148.
a result. For example, countries whose regional ec­
onomies lack the dynamic potential for economic de­
velopment have engaged in equalization policies— 
such as breaking up the preponderance of a single 
urban-industrial complex—thus obviously failing to 
grasp the substance of their problem. The reverse— 
that is, misapplication of regional development poli­
cies—has been executed as well in other countries.
The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate, using 
the case of Greece for the period between 1952-1965, 
that the formulation of policy decisions aiming at re­
gional equalization can lead to undesirable results 
when programs fail to take into account the marginal 
productivities of both agricultural and industrial 
workers, and more importantly, the forces causing 
unwanted population movements as they exacerbate 
regional inequalities.
II. some aggregate measures 
of regional inequality
The Greek economy is essentially agricultural in 
nature with a relatively small and slow-growing in­
dustrial sector (see Table 1). In spite of the massive 
aid received by Greece under the auspices of the 
Marshall Plan between 1948 and 1955, the relative 
shares of the agricultural, industrial, and service sec­
tors of the gross national income have been little af­
fected. For example, although agriculture’s share 
decreased from 34 percent in 1948 to 25 percent in 
1955 and has continued at this level, the other major 
sectors—manufacturing and services—have remained 
roughly constant at approximately 16 and 46 percent 
respectively. The remarkable stability of these com­
ponents of the economy indicates a lack of noticeable 
movement toward either industrialization or a more 
intensive use of the country’s agricultural resources: 
there is a lack of resources such as iron ore, coal, and 
cheap electric power to sustain industrialization;and 
large scale agricultural development has been stymied 
by a constant drain of labor via both migration to the 
Athens region and emigration abroad.
The distribution of economic activities among the 
various regions is neither equal nor stable. In 1958, 
for example, Athens accounted for about 45.7 percent 
of the total number of industrial firms, 53.2 percent 
of total industrial employment, and 55.7 percent of 
total industrial output. In 1963 those figures were 
50.4 percent, 54.8 percent, and 51.0 percent respec­
tively. Moreover, of the 14 percent national increase 
in manufacturing employment between 1958 and 
1963, Athens accounted for approximately 85 percent.
The disproportionate share claimed by Athens 
is pervasive throughout the Greek economy. In 1962, 
for example, Athens, with roughly 23 percent of the 
total population, accounted for approximately 41 per-
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TABLE 1. Industrial Origin of Gross National Income 
at Factor Cost (In Millions of Dollars at Current Prices)
1948 1955 1961 1964
Agriculture, forestry 
and fishing 206.9 658.2 958.4 1,155.2
Mining and quarrying 2.9 19.5 37.0 44.0
Manufacturing 82.2 338.8 562.2 731.6
Electricity, gas and 
water works 4.6 21.6 52.5 77.5
Construction 20.7 98.6 229.9 328.3
Services 278.0 1,081.6 1,652.0 2,184.3
Gross domestic product 
at factor cost 595.3 2,218.3 3,492.0 4,520.9
Net income payments to 
factors of production 
due from the rest of 
the world 3.4 31.2 79.4 111.6
Gross National Income 
at factor cost 598.7 2,249.5 3,571.4 4,632.5
Source: Calculations based on Ministry of Coordination, «National Ac­
counts of Greece», No. 16 (Athens: 1967), 49-50.
TABLE 2. Per Capita Regional Incomes and per Capita 
Gross Regional Product, 1962
Greater Athens Region 812 223 627 153.6
Rest of Central Greece 273 74 307 76.6
Macedonia 271 73 371 92.6
Peloponnesos 217 59 355 80.6
Thrace 236 64 287 71.5
Thessaly 234 63 297 74.1
Aegean Islands 216 59 274 68.4
Crete 217 59 265 66.0
Epirus 145 39 227 56.9
Ionian Islands 141 38 231 57.7
Total Greece 367 100 400 100.0
a Milistry of Coordination, Regional Development Service, 
b Centre of Planning and Economic Research, «Draft of the Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan for Greece: 1966-1970» (Athens: 1965).
cent of the national domestic product, while its share 
in other activities was the following:
Public Utilities 74%
Transport-Communications 47%
Trade 58%
Credit, Insurance, etc. 77%
Public Administration 51%
Health 53%
Other Services 51%!
The regional distribution of per capita incomes and 
per capita gross product,1 2 perhaps the most re­
vealing indices of regional inequality, also indicates 
the preponderance of the Athens region. Table 2 dis­
plays these data for 1962.
Table 3 shows the regional employment structure 
by economic sector. It is evident that, outside the 
Greater Athens Region (GAR), agriculture occupies 
the largest part of all the regions’ labor forces. This 
is consistent with the absence of any massive resource 
concentrations that would allow some regions to spe­
cialize in non-agricultural activities. Also shown in 
Table 3 is the sectoral make-up of regional gross pro­
ducts, which is as skewed as sectoral employment.
1. Center of Planning and Economic Research, Draft of 
the Five-Year Economic Development Plan for Greece, 
1966-1970 (Athens: 1965), p. 146.
2. This indicator is probably more representative of the 
productive capacities of the regions since income differences 
are not adjusted for variations in the regional price structures. 
For example, a comparison of incomes between, say Athens 
and Thessaly, should yield somewhat smaller differences for 
the higher prices prevailing in this region.
Overlaying the regional employment data onto the 
sectoral distribution of regional gross products, one 
can note that relatively more labor is devoted to 
agriculture than is justified on the basis of agricul­
ture’s contribution to the gross product. This con­
trast by no means constitutes a yardstick for meas­
uring relative labor efficiency by sector and region; 
it also tends to lead to the false conclusion, in the 
absence of data on marginal labor productivities, 
that, in the long run, migration of agricultural 
workers to Athens, as well as mobility of labor from 
agriculture to industry or services, raises per capita 
incomes. We will argue below that perhaps the re­
verse is more likely to be the case.
The distribution of regional infrastructural capital 
in Greece is equally lopsided. Although it is ex­
tremely difficult to inventory social capital, a crude but 
probably indicative picture can be drawn. Health fa­
cilities, including physicians, are overwhelmingly con­
centrated in the GAR, with no other region even 
approaching the national average. Education facili­
ties exhibit a similar pattern. For example, in 1961 the 
GAR had about 15 percent of the country’s school- 
age population while in that same year it contained 
some 33 percent of the country’s high shool stu­
dents; this can plausibly be explained by the fact 
that migrants receive their primary education in their 
villages before migrating to Athens, so that the metro­
politan demand for primary education is relatively 
small. Also in 1961,51 percent of all private elementa­
ry schools were located in Athens; this represented 46 
percent of the total number of schools.
Vocational training facilities are also heavily con-
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TABLE 3. Employment Composition and Distribution of Gross Product by Economic Sector and'Region, 1961-62
(In Percentage)
Agriculture Manufacturing Services
Region
Percentage
Employment
Percentage of 
Gross Product
Percentage
Employment
Percentage of 
Gross Product
Percentage
Employment
Percentage of 
Gross Product
Greater Athens Region 5.6 3.0 40.8 36.6 53.6 60.4
Rest of Central Greece 71.1 49.0 13.4 19.7 15.5 31.1
Macedonia 66.3 42.7 16.7 23.1 17.0 34.2
Peloponnesos 70.0 49.1 12.7 20.0 17.3 30.9
Thrace 80.0 59.6 8.7 12.8 10.5 27.6
Thessaly 67.8 48.5 15.5 19.1 16.7 32.4
Aegean Islands 55.7 31.4 19.1 23.1 25.2 45.5
Crete 72.0 41.4 11.6 18.4 16.4 40.2
Epirus 71.9 38.9 12.9 22.0 15.2 39.1
Ionian Islands 70.0 32.0 11.9 21.6 18.1 46.4
Total Greece 55.8 28.2 19.8 27.1 24.4 44.7
Source: Ministry of Coordination, Center of Planning and Economic Research.
centrateci in Athens: in 1961, about 50 percent of 
all vocational schools and 53 percent of all vocational 
students were located in the GAR. The installment 
and consumption of electric power are additional in­
dices of considerable importance: in 1961 the GAR 
consumed 65 percent of the country’s total power and 
62 percent of its total industrial power. Domestic 
power consumption at the same time was 2,900 kilo­
watts per 10,000 population—3.7 times the national 
average with, again, no other region approaching the 
national average.
The intensity of the Greek regional problem is 
clearly reflected in the relative population of the 
Greater Athens Region vis-à-vis the rest of the 
country. During the decade 1951-61, total population 
increased from 7,630,000 to 8,380,000—an increase 
of 9.8 percent—while the GAR’s population increased 
from 1,378,000 to 1,852,000, an increase of 34.4 per­
cent. More than 70 percent of the GAR’s net popula­
tion gain consisted of migration from the other nine 
regions of the country. Moreover, the GAR account­
ed for 68 percent of Greece’s total urban population 
increase during the same decade, while Salonika, the 
second largest city, accounted for only 12 percent.
The GAR is the only collector of domestic mi­
grants, adding to its population for the period 1960-65 
more people through migration than the total nat­
ural population growth of Greece. The maritime re­
gions plus Thrace, Epirus, and Peloponnesos have 
registered substantial population losses; of these, 
Thrace and the Aegean Islands are the only ones 
losing more population in foreign migration than to 
the GAR. The comparison of net migration per an­
num with the annual natural population increase for 
each individual region shows that six regions, con­
stituting roughly 40 percent of the country’s popula­
tion, are actually being depopulated. Peloponnesos
and the maritime regions in particular have had sev­
ere population losses dating from 1956.
The allocation of state investment funds is an ef­
fective means of leveling off regional disparities inas­
much as Greece is consciously pursuing a policy of 
decentralization. There are two types of public in­
vestment: productive and social or infrastructure in­
vestment. From an economic standpoint, the under­
taking of productive investments is less useful for 
regional equalization objectives than is that of in­
frastructural investment, because the feasibility 
of productive investments is defined in terms 
that are irrelevant to the degree and magni­
tude of regional disparities. It is frequently the 
case that more developed regions offer more invest­
ment opportunities and higher benefit-cost ratios per 
dollar than do less developed regions.1 In contrast, 
the provision of infrastructural capital is well-suited 
to the pursuit of regional equalization objectives 
since it is not subject to hard economic calculations.2
1. Mr. Rahman finds that it would pay, under certain 
conditions, to concentrate investment in less developed re­
gions, that have a higher rate of saving than other regions. He 
states that ((in the presence of differential regional rates of 
saving, the rate of growth of total national income is not nec­
essarily maximized by concentrating investment in the more 
productive region throughout the planning period». He sub­
sequently shows in a two-region model when to shift invest­
ments from one region to another. See M. A. Rahman, «Re­
gional Allocation of Investment», in Regional Development 
and Planning,ed. by J. Friedman and W. Alonso (Cambridge: 
M.I.T. Press, 1964), p. 655. Note that in the above context, 
the allocation of (productive) investment may have an equal­
izing effect on the economy which is largely incidental.
2. In those countries where urbanization rates exceed 
growth rates, the large urban agglomerations absorb most 
of the funds earmarked for the provision of infrastructure, 
thus reducing the planning authority’s capacity to embark 
upon an effective policy of regional equalization. This by 
itself has become a powerful argument for urban decentrali­
zation.
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TABLE 4. Percentage Distributiona of Regional Investments as a Percentage of Total State Investment, by Category,
1954-1965
Health
Region Total Agric. Mfg. Public
Utilities
Transp. Tourism. Educat. and
Welfare
Public
Admin.
Housing Mise.
Rest of Central 25.7 21.1 8.5 25.7 35.6 40.4 36.1 42.8 63.2 36.8 17.6
Greece»
Peloponnesos 12.9 12.0 2.5 7.8 17.0 14.6 7.5 7.5 2.2 20.8 16.9
Ionian Islands 1.7 0.4 0.0 17.0 1.6 5.1 1.0 3.2 3.0 0.7 4.1
Epirus 6.0 6.8 0.2 3.0 7.6 6.0 1.9 2.5 3.8 5.0 8.1
Thessaly 9.8 6.1 17.1 3.6 12.8 5.8 2.8 10.2 4.9 3.3 7.2
Macedonia 31.2 40.1 70.8 28.5 14.6 12.4 44.1 24.7 16.9 22.6 20.0
Thrace 5.1 12.1 0.1 5.7 3.7 1.5 1.4 2.4 2.4 2.1 3.5
Aegean Islands 3.5 0.7 0.2 5.7 3.1 9.1 1.1 2.2 2.2 3.5 10.6
Crete 4.1 0.7 0.6 16.6 4.0 5.1 6.6 1.4 1.4 5.2 12.0
Total Greece 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
a Only 70 per cent of the total State Investment Budget can be regionally classified, 
b This region includes the Greater Athens Region.
Source: Ministry of Coordination, «The Regional Distribution of Investments in the Past» (in Greek) (unpublished paper, Athens, 1968).
Table 4 shows the percentage distribution of re­
gional investments in Greece by category and as a 
percentage of the total state allocation for a given cat­
egory. The dollars involved for the 11-year period 
shown are-about $ 1.33 billion although the entire 
State Investment Budget was about $ 1.85 billion for 
the same period—about $ 0.52 billion cannot be re­
gionally disaggregated. The table shows that the 
GAR’s share of the State Investment Budget, although 
combined with that for the Rest of Central Greece re­
gion, is the second largest and not as much larger as 
one would expect than that of the Peloponnesos. The 
«non-productive» investments, such as health and 
education, seem to be large for the GAR-RCG but are 
essentially small with respect to this region’s total 
budget. This is so because the budgets of the other 
regions are mostly absorbed by agricultural manu­
facturing and transport activities, so that relatively 
little is left for social overhead. Therefore, the per­
centage of the GAR’s budget devoted to infrastruc­
ture is not higher than those of the other regions and, 
if adjustments are made to take into account different 
population sizes, it may be estimated that the GAR 
has roughly the third or fourth highest per-capita 
investment for infrastructural purposes.
ΠΙ. an assessment of Greek 
decentralization efforts
The Greek government undertook measures for 
the spatial dispersion of industry under the auspices 
of a series of legislative acts that began in 1952 and 
apparently ended in 1967. These measures consisted 
entirely of a system of indirect subsidies to those in­
dustries willing to «decentralize» outside of the 
Greater Athens Region, and took the form of tax
credits, accelerated depreciation, the development of 
tax-free reserves, and tax reductions on net profits 
intended for reinvestment.
Tax credits were of two varieties: those designed 
to lower the production costs of industries choosing 
a «provincial» location, and those that developed in­
centives for the re-investment of tax savings in an 
attempt to increase total investment outside the GAR. 
The former variety included sales tax reductions, tar­
iff exoneration schemes for imported capital goods, 
freedom from local taxes, reductions in employer 
contributions to social security, and the elimination of 
the 6% tax on wages and salaries. Of these tax incent­
ives, the last three were made available to all industries 
willing to locate outside the GAR, with the full bene­
fits accruable regardless of distance from the GAR’s 
border; the first and second offered full benefits at a 
maximum distance of 60 miles from the border. This 
proved to be one of the major weaknesses of the de­
centralization effort, since an industry could realize 
a 20% reduction in sales taxes right on the GAR 
border, 30% for moving an additional 30 miles, and 
the maximum 40% anywhere else in the country; the 
tariff reduction scheme offered complete tariff exon­
eration to any industry moving 30 miles from the 
GAR, and a 50% reduction within the 30-mile bounda­
ry.
The second type of tax incentives included accele­
rated depreciation schemes, the development of tax- 
free reserves, and tax benefits on net profits intended 
for reinvestment. These were equally unrealistic in a 
geographic sence since they offered no substantive 
benefits to truly provincial industry. For example, 
while depreciation rates for capital equipment of 
«provincial» industries were twice as high as those 
of industries located in the GAR, again the term
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«provincial» was applied to all locations other than 
those directly within the GAR.
In retrospect, the main weakness of the decentral­
ization program was its failure to place the tax in­
centives on a spatially graduated basis. Since in most 
cases the full advantages of the tax credits were 
realizable on the fringe of the GAR, and in some 
cases at a maximum distance of 30 miles from it, a 
«provincial» location could in theory be attained at 
20 to 25 miles from central Athens and many firms 
«decentralized» accordingly. Because the GAR is 
constantly expanding and spilling over into the ad­
jacent department of Boeotia, it is inevitable that a 
substantial portion of the «decentralized» industry 
will be reabsorbed by the GAR.
It is difficult to develop accurate measures to eval­
uate the effectiveness of the decentralization pro­
gram given both its loose objectives and the scarcity 
of relevant data. Some estimates developed to measu­
re the regional distribution of industrial employment 
indicate that between 1958 and 1963 the GAR’s share 
rose from 41.4% to 46.8%. Three-fourths of this in­
crease consisted of the entire national percentage 
growth for this period while the rest came at the ex­
pense of the other regions. In other words, not only 
did the GAR’s increase account for the national in­
crease in industrial employment but the GAR di­
verted workers from the rest of the country as well. 
Between 1961 and 1966 the GAR’s share of the coun­
try’s industrial firms rose from 85% to 86%, while of 
the 10% of the GAR’s firms that responded to Decree 
4002/1959, offering tax reductions on net profits to 
industries moving outside the GAR, nearly all re­
located on its fringe.
Of greater importance is the program’s effect on 
the enhancement of provincial investment. The dif­
ficulty in measuring this effect lies in the fact that to­
tal investment levels in those industries most likely 
to respond to the tax incentives exhibit both a high 
degree of instability and a long-run tendency to de­
crease. Research completed by the Center of Planning 
and Economic Research in Athens suggests that the 
development of private investments in industry over 
the last fifteen years has not indicated any positive 
response to the tax incentives.1 A satisfactory way to 
measure the program’s overall effectiveness in stim­
ulating provincial investment is to identify the re­
lationship between autonomous investment and in­
vestment induced by the system of tax credits. This 
can be formalized as follows for any selected period
1. Center of Planning and Economic Research, The Ef­
fectiveness of the Tax Incentives in Greece and Some 
Proposals for Their Improvement (in Greek, Athens: 1967). 
This conclusion is based on the fact that other variables, 
independent of the tax incentives, explain all of the fluctuations 
in private investment levels.
of time in which the program is operating:
Gtl It
I, 17
where
Gtl = government tax losses or other costs arising from the 
program
I, = total investment in the areas specified by the program 
11 = investment induced by tax credits
I„ = autonomous investment
The program’s effectiveness is maximized if for 
every positive change in total investment the value 
of the right side of the above expression is greater 
than that of the left side. A qualification of the above 
expression is that, since the program should be de­
signed in such away as to assure that a given loss in 
government tax revenue brings forth a positive change 
in total investment, the left side must be less than uni­
ty, reflecting the fact that total investment is a com­
posite of induced and autonomous investment.
So ne estimates made by the Center of Planning 
and Economic Research indicate that over the course 
of the decentralization program the total loss of gov­
ernment [revenue attributable to the program was 
between 0.3 and 0.4 of total investments, and that the 
ratio of induced to autonomous investment was at 
least 0.6. The difference between the two sides of the 
above expression was estimated to be at a maximum. 
Yet the decentralization program failed both to de- 
congest Athens and to spread investments in lagging 
regions. Even if induced investment was correctly 
estimated to equal 60% of autonomous investment, it 
was so only by definition since it took place at a max­
imum of 40 miles from the central city. Considering 
that the cost of the program in terms of revenue los­
ses for the years 1959-1966 was $ 162.5 million (the 
total amount for 1954-1967 is not known), it amounted 
to a costly subsidy to industry. This large allocation 
might truly have narrowed interregional differences 
had it been used by the government to stimulate pro­
vincial industry or promote projects of a broader re­
gional significance.
IV. an alternative analytic view
The policy followed by the Greek government for 
roughly fifteen years was based on the assumptions 
that the concentration of industry in the GAR pre­
vented the rest of the economy from realizing its full 
potential, and that given the proper incentives the 
locational advantages of the GAR could be lessened 
so as to pro note industrial growth elsewhere. Greek 
planners failed to assess properly both the full range 
of the GAR’s locational advantages and the dynam­
ics of population movements and consequently ac­
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tually aggravated the country’s regional imbalance. 
An attempt is made below to construct a somewhat 
different, and hopefully more accurate, analytic basis 
for dealing with the problem.
In order to clarify the implications of the imba­
lance and general systemic behavior of the Greek re­
gional economy, two parameters will be briefly anal­
yzed: these are domestic migration and income levels. 
A. Domestic Migration. Domestic or interregional 
migration can be defined—in accordance with clas­
sical economic theory—as the propensity of individ­
uals to migrate on the basis of real or assumed job 
opportunities, income levels, and living conditions 
prevailing in other regions. Table 5 lists the data for 
the ten Greek regions from which the following re­
gression equation is obtained. The application of the 
above definition of domestic migration to the data 
yields a correlation coefficient of 0.9857.
(1) DM = — 1.80 + 0.20 (w — w) + 0.086ΔΕ 
[1961] [1951-61]
Domestic migration (DM) has been expressed as a 
percentage of the 1960 regional population while the 
first explanatory variable (w-w) denotes the differ­
ence between regional and national per capita in­
comes in 1961. The second variable (ΔΕ) denotes the 
percentage change in the demand for labor in each 
region during the period 1951 to 1961.
The partial correlation coefficients between (DM)
TABLE 5. Input Data for Equations Fitted for Greece
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1951-61 1951- 1961 1961 1961
(Δ”ΤΡ) (DM) (ΔΕ) (w — w) (w — 100)
GAR 2.94 9.96 35.8 448 123.0
RCG 0.67 —2.20 12.0 —91 —25.0
THE 1.04 —2.10 26.6 —130 —35.7
PEL —0.29 —5.60 7.6 —147 —40.4
MAC 1.07 —0.27 24.9 —93 —25.6
EPI —0.64 —5.80 23.3 —219 —60.2
THR 0.56 —0.17 14.0 —128 —35.3
ION. IS —0.72 —6.85 —1.7 —223 —61.3
AG IS. —1.02 —5.40 —4.5 —148 —40.7
CRE 0.46 —3.80 22.5 —147 —40.4
Source: Data taken and estimated from the 1951 and 1961 Population 
Censuses and the Statistical Yearbooks for the years 1960 
through 1967.
TABLE 6. Actual and Estimated Domestic Migration in 
Greece: 1960-1965
Influence of In- Influence of 
Actual Estimated come Differen- Growth in 
Region Migration Migration ces from Na- Demand for 
tional Average Labor 
(w — w) (ΔΕ)
GAR 9.96 10.44 9.18 3.06
RCG —2.20 —2.63 —1.86 1.03
THE —2.10 —2.19 —2.66 2.27
PEL —5.60 —4.16 —3.01 0.65
MAC —0.27 —1.58 —1.91 2.13
EPI —5.80 —4.30 —4.49 1.99
THR —0.17 —3.22 —2.62 1.20
ION.IS. —6.85 —6.52 —4.57 —0.15
AG IS. —5.40 —5.21 —3.03 —0.38
CRE —3.80 —2.89 —3.01 1.92
and (w - w) and between (DM) and (ΔΕ) are both 
highly significant, with values of 0.9672 and 0.7133 
respectively.1
Table 6 assists in the development of an under­
standing of the quantitative effect on domestic mi­
gration on the two explanatory variables. Inter­
estingly, the income-generated pull of the GAR on 
migrants was three times greater than the pull linked 
to the growth of job opportunities. The creation of 
job opportunities—virtually the entire thrust of the 
Greek decentralization program—by itself had rel­
atively little effect on migration. For example, the 
demand for labor in Macedonia increased by 150,000 
jobs between 1951 and 1961, while in the GAR it rose 
by 180,000 jobs; but because of the GAR’s more fa­
vorable income image, the impact on migration was 
much greater than the small differential in the de­
mand for labor would suggest. Other regions with 
relatively large increases in the demand for labor, 
such as Crete and Thessaly, were likewise unable to 
check the migration to the GAR.
It appears from these observations that, while re­
gional income differences are generally recognized as 
t he most significant factors in the causality of migra­
tion, in the case of Greece they seem virtually to be 
the only factors. The GAR’s income image essential­
ly dictates interregional population movements, 
which in turn generate the regional inequalities dis­
cussed earlier. The significance of this conclusion be­
comes critical to economic planners when the etiolo­
gy of income differences is taken into account. 
B. Income Levels. In order to examine the causes of 
income differences among regions, we have employed
1. With a total of ten observations the critical value for 
the correlation coefficients at the 0.95 confidence limit is 
0.6319.
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a model developed by Klaassen1 which, simply stated, 
holds that income differences are linked to the de­
mand and supply of labor in various regional set­
tings. Its basic assumptions are: (1) migration to a 
region is positively related to the differences between 
the region’s wage level and the average national wage 
level; (2) the wage level prevailing in various regions 
is the predominant factor in industrial locational pref­
erences (a collective variable z represents all other 
exogenous considerations accounting for these pref­
erences); (3) there is a constant proportion of the 
population representing the demand for labor by 
non-basic industries; and (4) in any particular region, 
conditions of full employment prevail. Four equa­
tions expressing these assumptions, along with three 
identities, constitute the seven structural equations 
of the model. From these equations two «reduced» 
equations are derived, one for the total regional la­
bor force and the other for the regional differences 
in wage levels. Although it is not necessary to repro­
duce here Klaassen’s model, his application of it to 
the nine Belgian provinces merits attention. Klaassen 
used the direct least squares method to fit his Belgian 
data and obtained a value for the coefficient of mul­
tiple correlation of 0.85 from his reduced form equa­
tion for wage differences. This equation is:
[labor supply] [labor demand]
(2) (w — 100) = — 4.3 — 2.75Δη TP + 2.27ΔΕ (0.5)
[1950-59] [1950-59]
The endogenous variable (w-100) denotes the dif­
ference between provincial and national per capita 
incomes. The first exogenous variable (ΔηΤΡ) repre­
sents the national population growth while the second 
[ΔΕ(0.5)] stands for the one-half of one percent in­
crease in the employment of basic industries.
When the Greek data were fitted to Klaassen’s 
model a coefficient of multiple correlation of 0.88 
was obtained together with the following equation:
(3) (w — 100) = 23.20 + 50.71Δ" TP — 2.46ΔΕ(0.5)
[1951-61] [1951-61]
The partial correlation coefficient between (w -100) 
and ΔηΤΡ is statistically significant with a value of 
0.85, while that between (w - 100) and ΔΕ (0.5), with a 
value of 0.57, is not statistically significant.
Klaassen’s reduced-form equation was subsequently 
modified so that the differences between regional 
and national per-capita incomes—expressed now in 
real terms—were regressed against the percentage 
increase in total regional population (supply of labor)
1. Klaassen, L. H..Area Economic and Social Devel­
opment: Guidelines for Progress. Paris.· OECD, 1965.
and against the percentage increase in the demand 
for labor by both basic and service industries. This 
equation is:
(4) (w —w) - —23.52 + 56.80Δ" TP — 14.12ΔΕ(0.5) 
[1951-61] [1951-61]
The multiple correlation coefficient is again statisti­
cally significant with a value of 0.8538.
The contrast between the Belgian and the Greek 
cases illustrates the point that the laws of the demand 
and the supply of labor have greater applicability to 
Belgium than to Greece. Conceivably, the limitations 
imposed on the model by assumptions (2) and (4), 
as well as the fact that Greece has a single urban-in­
dustrial complex rather than several, may exaggerate 
the real differences between the two countries. How­
ever, these considerations cannot explain away the 
contrast since the equations could be constructed to 
suit them quite independently of the model mecha­
nism. In fact the modifications imposed on equation 
(4) produce a better analytic framework by taking in­
to fuller account Greece’s regional peculiarities. The 
fact that in the Greek case the influence of population 
growth (supply of labor) on incomes is positive rather 
than negative simply reinforces the magnitude of the 
problem.
V. policy perspectives
Prolonged migration, as a function of the GAR’s 
income image, coupled with relatively low investments 
in mechanizing agriculture (which simply means that 
the loss of agricultural workers to the national econo­
my and their conversion into industrial and service 
workers takes place without compensatory invest­
ments in agricultural mechanization), is rapidly re­
ducing regional incomes below their real potential. In 
the absence of compensatory investments, the loss of 
even a few agricultural workers has a disproportion­
ate effect on incomes since the lost marginal pro­
ductivity of these workers is of greater magnitude 
than the added agricultural capital component. The 
sensitivity of provincial regions to income-linked po­
pulation losses amply demonstrates this point. More­
over, as discussed earlier, «decentralized» industry 
has neither produced the jobs nor sufficiently re­
directed the pattern of private investments to really 
compensate these regions for the decreases in agri­
cultural productivity. If anything, «decentralized» 
industry has absorbed labor from agriculture and 
thus affected regional growth potential even more se­
verely.
It seems apparent that as long as the GAR conti-
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nues to project a higher income image to the other re­
gions there is little or no value in industrial decentral­
ization schemes. An alternative policy, based on the 
dual strategies of increased investment in provincial 
agriculture and of investments calculated to raise the 
cultural level of the provincial regions, promises 
greater pay-off in the long run. Since migration is 
triggered largely by expectations of the superior life 
style and its concomitant social and cultural opportu­
nities promised by the GAR via its income picture, 
policies which focus on reducing these differentials 
are obviously preferable.
The possibility of exploring sociological solu­
tions to problems defined in strict economic terms 
should open new and perhaps intriguing vistas 
to economic planners. Such strategies as state 
subsidies to regional theater groups and cultural 
centers, the development of day-care centers, and 
other related activities may boost the quality of 
life in cities other than Athens to the point where they 
too may begin acting as collectors of migrants. It is 
quite probable that such measures may have a better 
chance than the costly industrial subsidies of inter­
vening effectively between the migrant’s conception 
of living patterns in the GAR and the reality of his 
own environment.
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